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ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT?: PRIMARY
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT-THE NEW
FACE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
JOHN SANDS*
I come to this business of arbitrating and mediating after hav-
ing spent time as an advocate, while a union lawyer, and thereaf-
ter as an arbitrator, when I switched sides to represent manage-
ment.' In retrospect, the strength of that preparation was the
interaction with mediators and arbitrators on both sides of the ta-
ble. Having a sense of the damage that can be done gives me a
very valuable perspective on the process.
I have problems with the title of this discussion: "Clearing the
Docket: Alternative Dispute Resolution." There are three things
wrong with the phrase, "Alternative Dispute Resolution ('ADR')."
The first problem is with the word, "alternative." The second is
with the word, "dispute." The third is with the word, "resolution."
"Alternative" is problematic because it begs the question, "Alter-
native to what?"2 You see, ADR is a lawyer's concept. For many
lawyers, ADR is alternative to litigation, which in their minds is
the primary way of resolving disputes. And it has been so since
we abandoned trial by combat and chose the alternative of litiga-
tion in baronial courts.
* B.S., Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Attorney and alternative dispute
resolution professional. Professor of Law, Albany Law School 1973 to 1983. Member of Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, American
Bar Association's Alternative Dispute Resolution Section, and Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New Jersey
State Bar Association.
1 See generally Jerome K Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the ADR Move-
ment, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 424 (1986) (outlining roles of mediation, arbitration, concilia-
tion and negotiation); William K Slate, Arbitration Comes of Age, AM. LAw., May 1995, at 8(detailing roles played by attorneys in ADR).
2 See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 1, at 426-27. "[Allternative in one of two senses:
because the parties privately choose to avoid litigation... or because legal rules require or
permit the courts to send the dispute elsewhere." Id.
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I do not, however, accept the proposition that litigation is or
should be the primary process for addressing conflict. That is not
how life operates.3 Most rational people solve problems in other
ways than by running out, finding lawyers and spending five years
making each other as miserable as possible before some outsider,
a judge, imposes an outcome on their relationship. So, litigation
should be the alternative, and a final one at that; what we are
talking about here should be primary.4
My second problem with the term, "Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion," is its focus on "disputes." If you ignore a problem long
enough, it will ineluctably evolve into a fully-blown dispute. 5 It
makes a lot more sense to address problems as early and effec-
tively as possible rather than to wait for them to become disputes
with a much heavier impact on the parties' interests.
My third problem, with the word "resolution," concerns what ac-
tion the process must accomplish. "Resolution" of a fully-blown
dispute is a big job, usually harder and more expensive than solv-
ing the earlier problem that ultimately generated the dispute.
The phrase, "alternative dispute resolution," accordingly suggests
a secondary process that operates too late to do too big a job, and
that is a problem.
Instead of "alternative dispute resolution," I believe the more
useful and appropriate term should be "primary problem solving,"
or "primary conflict management." With that approach the title of
this program would not be "Clearing the Docket," which is what
ADR seeks. With primary problem solving, we seek to have no
docket to clear because many fewer cases would come to litigation.
Let me suggest a different approach to this concept that does
present a true alternative. Look up, and you will see an example
of what I call primary problem solving: this building's sprinkler
system. The Law School's risk manager reasonably anticipated a
risk of loss due to fire and addressed it with a mechanism
designed to limit the loss consequences of those fires that do oc-
3 See Richard W. Page, Appropriate Dispute Resolution in North America, N.Y. L.J., May
4, 1995, at A3 (commenting on ADR procedures dignity and preference over traditional
litigation).
4 See Slate, supra note 1, at 8. "ADR is no longer viewed just as an alternative to litiga-
tion, but has taken its rightful place as one of a set of options to be built into legal and
business planning." Id.
5 See id. at 9 (outlining how effective use of ADR resolves disputes).
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cur.6 Other such risk management efforts would include using
fireproof construction materials to prevent losses and purchasing
fire insurance to indemnify losses. Risk management generally
involves identifying sources of loss and taking rational steps to
limit them.
It is equally appropriate to anticipate and address risk of loss
due to conflict.7 The potential costs to be avoided include not only
potential liability for compensatory and punitive damages but also
attorneys' fees and disruptions of a productive enterprise caught
in litigation.' There are tremendous costs associated with conflict.
Using the risk management approach for losses due to conflict
requires creative lawyering to design and implement effective sys-
tems that identify problems that can generate conflict as early and
effectively as possible and to address those problems while they
still are only problems. This can prevent the problems from evolv-
ing into fully-blown disputes that require lawyers, judges, a court
system and a docket of disputes to litigate. 9
The basic black-letter law of contracts provides tools to con-
struct conflict management systems, put them in place before they
are needed, and make positive outcomes more likely.10
Now, Wayne Outten's view of ADR is unusual for an attorney.
Many traditional attorneys view ADR as a collection of unitary
concepts that cannot vary from a few boilerplate formulations.
"Whoops," they say, "we've got a lawsuit. Let's mediate; let's arbi-
trate; let's use a mini-trial; let's use fact-finding." Those are the
ADR concepts they know. But what do they know about them?
All they frequently know about them is that processes with these
names exist. But, because they have not thought about creating
6 See David J. Berman, Managing Disputes In.House, RECORDER, May 22, 1995, at A6
(noting rise of company programs in form of internal problem solving tools to reduce risk of
litigation between employees and management).
7 See id. at 50 (noting potential cost savings from establishing solid ADR systems).
8 See Slate, supra note 1, at 8. "ADR costs are lower; dispositions are faster; privacy is
maintained; the process is less formal; and the outcomes can preserve and sometimes even
improve relationships among participants." Id.
9 See generally John B. Bates, Mediation: The Pursuit of Compromise, USA TODAY (Mag-
azine), Mar. 1994, at 38 (noting survey finding estimated $49,000,000 savings from ADR
use); Yardenna Hurvitz, Getting Comfortable With Change, RECORDER, Apr. 12, 1995, at A7
(citing rising use of mediation by attorneys).
10 See Slate, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing use of arbitration clauses in contracts); see
generally Page, supra note 3, at A5 (outlining elements which ADR contract clauses should
cover "including the ADR processes to be used, the appointing or administering authoring,
the number and qualifications of the arbitrator(s) or mediator, the procedural rules, the
location of the hearing(s) and the language of the award").
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systems that meet the culture and needs of the workplace or the
community with the problem, they often try to push the people
with the problem into a limited process, never realizing that they
can custom-design a system to address the problem."
Sexual harassment disputes in employment provide a useful ex-
ample of the shortcomings of traditional approaches and strengths
of creative lawyering. The difficulty of sexual harassment allega-
tions that are denied is that an employer can easily become caught
between and adverse to each of the primary disputants, the ac-
cuser and the accused. The dilemma in a stereotypical sexual har-
assment case is that, if the employer believes the charges, the ac-
cuser may sue and, if it believes the accuser, the accused may sue.
And the employer may have to wait anywhere from three to five
years to learn from a jury that it should have believed the other-
or that its investigation was flawed by self-interest. Either way-
and let us assume a good-faith decision in both cases-the em-
ployer loses, even if it should ultimately prevail in the resulting
litigation. As noted, traditional litigation is expensive and disrup-
tive. Successful standard mediation on the eve of trial would save
only the cost of trial and do nothing to avoid the costs and disrup-
tions of discovery and preparation while the case awaits trial.
And it seems unlikely that a plaintiff with a juicy jury issue would
agree to voluntary arbitration.
Now let us analyze the situation with the primary-conflict-man-
agement approach that I propose. The employer's problem is that
it must make a credibility determination that it is not qualified,
either by experience or disinterest, to make. And that problem is
complicated by the lack of any significant incentive for the pri-
mary disputants to cooperate fully with the employer's investiga-
tion. Indeed, an employee who is a potential plaintiff operating
with a "lottery" mentality might adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude or
even withhold information in the hope of improving his or her case
in future litigation with the employer.
A system I have developed to manage such conflict uses arbitra-
tion and mediation elements in an advisory fact-finding process
that keeps the employer from getting caught between the primary
11 See, e.g., Richard K. Jeydel, In-house Counsel Increasingly Depend on ADR, N.J. LAw.,
May 22, 1995, at A18 (addressing need to tailor ADR clauses to particular environment
with problem).
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disputants and, as a practical matter, obligates them to partici-
pate affirmatively in addressing the problem. In effect the em-
ployer contracts out the necessary credibility determination to an
impartial, professional arbitrator to conduct a hearing and issue a
non-binding fact-finder's report that the employer will use to eval-
uate the situation and decide what action to take.12 The employer
uses the same management authority that it would have used to
say, "Tell me what happened," instead to say, "Tell the fact-finder
what happened; and I, the employer, will wait until I have neu-
trally-determined findings of fact to decide how to proceed."
This is a minimalist procedure because no one must waive any-
thing. The primary disputants keep whatever rights and causes
of action they may have, and the employer retains its full range of
managerial prerogatives to address the situation. The primary
disputants must, on pain of insubordination or adverse inference
from lack of participation, cooperate fully to convince the fact-
finder of their respective probity.
When I developed this procedure, I had thought there were
three possible outcomes, all of which would improve the em-
ployer's resulting position. Assume first the employer's "worst-
case" scenario: the fact-finder determines that sexual harassment
did occur as charged. In that case the employer will have had a
neutral determination of that fact not more than three weeks after
the initial charge, instead of having to wait five years while back
pay liability mounts and a perception of "justice delayed" builds
that can generate a large punitive damage award.
Having neutral confirmation of exposure enables the employer
to take immediate steps to solve the problem. For example, a pro-
motion decision tainted by sexual misconduct can be rolled back
and rerun by a disinterested manager while the complainant re-
ceives three weeks back pay for the position he or she claims to
have been wrongly denied. Other sexual misconduct scenarios
will obviously produce more expensive outcomes for the employer,
but, in any case, early determination of the facts will enable the
employer to minimize losses and take early corrective action evi-
dencing good faith that may assuage a potential plaintiff's outrage
12 See Slate, supra note 1, at 8. Fact finding, pursuant to the ADR, provides for an "in-
vestigation of a complaint by impartial neutral parties who examine the issues and facts
for a nonbinding report." Id.
1995]
608 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
and reduce exposure to punitive damages. And the neutral deter-
mination of fact will shield the employer from wrongful discharge
or defamation claims by the accused.
In the second and third potential outcomes, the fact-finder
either (a) decides affirmatively that the charged sexual miscon-
duct did not occur or (b) concludes that the credibility conflict can-
not be determined based on the record adduced by the primary
disputants. In either case, the employer needs only to reiterate its
absolute policy that it will not tolerate sexual harassment, to con-
duct sensitivity training if appropriate, and to help re-establish a
productive relationship between the primary disputants.
In both cases, the employer is better off than if it had made the
same determination after its own investigation. First, the impar-
tial fact-finder's determination, made after a full hearing of testi-
mony, made under oath and subject to cross examination, will be
inherently more acceptable because of the fact-finder's lack of in-
terest and the primary disputants' full opportunity to participate
and be heard. As a result, a certain number of complainants, hav-
ing had a fair shot at convincing a neutral decision maker, will
have had the catharsis necessary to continue work without having
to seek vindication in a lawsuit. Second, those who remain suffi-
ciently enraged to pursue litigation are less likely, having had a
neutral determination of no case, to find an attorney willing to
take their case on a contingent basis. And finally, for those fewer
employees who do secure counsel and commence litigation, what
better posture for the employer before a judge or jury than to be
able to ask, "What more could we have done than to retain a neu-
tral finder of fact and to rely on his or her determination?" Cer-
tainly the employer's willingness voluntarily to adopt such a pro-
cedure is persuasive evidence of good faith. And the employer will
have the benefit of a transcript of plaintiff's allegations and proofs
at the fact-finding hearing that will establish conclusively the em-
ployer's state of knowledge at the time it addressed plaintiff's
claim.
In fact, I was gratified to discover a fourth, and most dramatic
outcome in these cases. In the dozen cases in which I have been
involved since developing this concept, not one hearing has had to
occur. In every case the primary disputants, forced to deal with
each other and the problem directly, have reached their own reso-
lutions. A few cases have ended based on little more than an apol-
[Vol. 10:603
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ogy and a handshake. In one case, however, a senior management
official took early retirement. In all cases, the primary disputants
executed releases to the employer as part of the settlement.
Why has this process worked so well? Because its design re-
quired the primary disputants to be in the same room and to par-
ticipate in solving the problem they own as well as the employer.
Contrast that with the parties' posture in traditional litigation,
which is to stay as far apart as possible, send in their lawyers,
keep everything as close as possible to the vest, share no informa-
tion, and wait five years for a determination of liability while their
lives turn into shambles around them.13 That, I suggest, is not
useful to anyone. The real challenge for creative lawyers, driven
by client service agendas, is to get the people with the problem
into the same room.
Now, what Wayne Outten called "cram-down arbitration" is the
result of a United States Supreme Court case, Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson Lane Corp. 14 In that case an individual's contract of em-
ployment, which required arbitration of disputes arising out of his
employment, was forced to stay plaintiff's federal court age dis-
crimination action and compel arbitration of his statutory claims
under the Stock Exchange's internal arbitration process.' 5
Wayne's "cram-down" epithet rests on the fact that, in order to
become a stockbrocker, Gilmer had to sign a U-4 agreement that,
like investors' form contracts with their brokers, requires submis-
sion of all disputes to arbitration under the rules of the New York
or American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, or the American Arbitration Association.' 6 Gilmer
had no choice. As a condition of employment he had to arbitrate
claims for which he would have otherwise have had the right to
sue in federal court to vindicate his statutory rights. Moreover,
Gilmer found himself in an arbitration process where the decision
Is See Bates, supra note 9, at 38. The key to successful mediation is party negotiation.
Id. "The heart of mediation-and the reason it is so efficient-is that it is an open, direct,
no-nonsense approach to getting the parties together to air their grievances and state their
positions." Id.
14 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
15 See id. at 26. The Court ruled that "all statutory claims may not be appropriate for
arbitration." Id. If a bargain to arbitrate has been made, however, "the party should be held
to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial reme-
dies for the statutory rights at issue." Id.
16 See id. at 20-21.
1995]
610 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
maker was someone from the securities industry17 -the opportu-
nities for conflict of interest are obvious-who may or may not
have had any training or experience in conducting hearings or in-
terpreting and applying legal rights. Small wonder that Gilmer
felt abused and that due process advocates call this "cram-down"
arbitration.
Whether or not you like what happened to Mr. Gilmer, the im-
portance of Gilmer is that it provides a useful conflict-manage-
ment tool. Creative lawyers can use contracts to create processes
that get disputants into the same room where problem solving can
occur."' Nothing in Gilmer would prevent an employer from re-
quiring mediation as a precondition for suing. 9 One of my col-
leagues, general counsel of a large insurance company, did just
that, adding to agents' employment contracts a requirement of at
least four hours of good faith negotiation between the parties in
the presence of a trained mediator before bringing lawsuits. That
got the people with the problem into the same room, and it re-
sulted in a dramatic reduction of litigation. Over the program's
first five years, only one case required a lawsuit as opposed to fifty
in the prior five years.
There are many other things one can do to design effective con-
flict management systems. 20 Time prevents addressing all, but
first you must identify the problem, identify the outcome you want
to achieve, and, working backwards from the outcome, develop
and draft a strategic process for getting from problem to
outcome. 2'
That is what true ADR should be. It is about lawyering. It is
not about waiting for a lawsuit and then saying, "I know these
things called mediation and arbitration; let's try to convince plain-
17 See id.; see also Mastrobuno v. Shearson Lehman, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995). The
Court held that although the contract called for use of New York law, "absen[t]... contrac-
tual intent to the contrary, the FAA would pre-empt [state law rules]." Id.
18 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). "[Alrbitration agreements are enforce-
able 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.'" Id.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Ellen Yamshon, Disabilities Act Doesn't Have to Be Bad News For Business,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 13, 1994, at F2. "The act itself.. . contains mechanisms to signifi-
cantly lower the burdens associated with resolving conflicts that arise from implementing
it." Id.
21 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 94-560, 1995 WL 306184, at *3 (U.S.
May 22, 1995). The Court held that if parties agree to arbitrate they can ask a court to
review the arbitrator's decision, "but the court will set that decision aside only in very
unusual circumstances". Id.
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tiff to forego a jury trial in the name of clearing overburdened
court calendars." That is not what ADR is about. That's kidding
yourself, and that's wasting clients' money.
The bottom line is not to let problems evolve so they become
grist for lawyers' mills, but rather to manage conflicts and to solve
problems as early and as effectively as possible. That is what true
ADR should be.

